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Abstract. We present an exact dynamical solution of a spherical version of the batch
minority game (MG) with random external information. The control parameters in
this model are the ratio of the number of possible values for the public information over
the number of agents, and the radius of the spherical constraint on the microscopic
degrees of freedom. We find a phase diagramwith three phases: two without anomalous
response (an oscillating versus a frozen state), and a further frozen phase with divergent
integrated response. In contrast to standard MG versions, we can also calculate
the volatility exactly. Our study reveals similarities between the spherical and the
conventional MG, but also intriguing differences. Numerical simulations confirm our
analytical results.
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1. Introduction
The dynamics of interacting agents is currently studied intensively, applying the ideas
and techniques of equilibrium and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. One of the
models which has attracted particular attention is the so-called minority game (MG),
introduced as a minimalist econophysics model for a financial market [1]. The players
in the MG are traders who, at each round of the game, have to make one of two
possible choices (e.g. buy or sell) in response to publicly available information. Each
aims to make profit by making the opposite choice to the majority of agents. The
interaction between agents is indirect: they cannot observe individual actions of others,
but only the subsequent cumulative effect of all actions on the market. To determine
their own trading actions, each agent holds a pool of strategies, assigned randomly
before the start of the game and then kept fixed. These effectively act as look-up tables,
mapping the observation of publicly available information onto a proposed trading
action. In the versions of the MG studied so far (e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4]) agents cannot
combine strategies, but select the one which they regard as their best. We refer to those
types of MGs as conventional. The identification of the best strategy is based on points
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the agents allocate to each of their strategies in order to measure their performance.
After each round of the game each agent evaluates the quality of each of his or her
strategies, increasing the points of strategies which would have yielded a correct minority
prediction. For a general overview of MG-type models we refer to [5].
The update rules of the MG look simple, but describe surprisingly complex
cooperative processes. This is most visible in the non-trivial behaviour of the
fluctuations of the total bid, the so-called market volatility [1, 6, 7, 2, 3]. The main
control parameter in MGs is the ratio α = p/N of the number p of possible values for
the public information over the number N of players. One observes a critical value αc
which marks a dynamical‡ phase transition, separating a non-ergodic phase (α < αc)
from an ergodic one (α > αc). In the non-ergodic phase, the volatility is very sensitive
to initial conditions [3, 8, 9], and the integrated response is infinite [4]. Moreover, in
the stationary state the system exhibits persistent oscillations in the non-ergodic phase,
whereas oscillations decay on finite time scales for α > αc [4, 10].
Analytical progress is possible using equilibrium and dynamical approaches and has
resulted in analytical expressions for αc, which are now regarded as exact [11, 4, 12, 13].
The generating functional analysis a` la De Dominicis [14] has proven particularly
valuable; it enabled a full understanding of the dynamics of the MG in the ergodic
phase. In this formalism, the strategy selection dynamics of the agents is mapped
onto a non-Markovian effective single agent process. In the case of conventional MGs,
the microscopic laws and the resulting single-trader process are non-linear and resist
analytical solution. Instead, one derives a coupled set of implicit equations for stationary
states, from which one tries to extract the values of the persistent order parameters. In
contrast to equilibrium systems, there are no fluctuation-dissipation relations which
could be used to simplify those equations. In the ergodic phase the analysis can
be simplified taking into account the existence of so-called ‘frozen agents’ (runaway
solutions of the microscopic laws). A proper understanding of the dynamics in the non-
ergodic regime, however, is still lacking. Moreover, for conventional MGs the market
volatility (the MG’s main observable) cannot be expressed in terms of persistent order
parameters. Instead, detailed knowledge of both the long-time and the short-time
behaviour of the macroscopic order parameters is required. Hence, even in the ergodic
phase, results for the volatility are so far restricted to approximations, whereas in the
non-ergodic phase only approximate asymptotic results in the limit α → 0 are available
[4]. For a recent review of dynamical MG analyses see e.g. [15]. Approximations for the
volatility in the ergodic state are also accessible within the framework of replica theory
[3].
In this paper we present a version of the MG which is analytically solvable, but
nevertheless displays some of the interesting features found in the conventional MG. To
this end we study the dynamics of a spherical version of the MG using the generating
functional approach. Like in spherical p-spin glasses with polynomial equations of
‡ MGs do not obey detailed balance, so one can only speak about non-equilibrium phase transitions.
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motion for the continuous microscopic degrees of freedom, explicit closed equations for
the two-time correlation and response functions can be formulated [16].
A second control parameter, the radius r of the sphere to which the dynamics is
confined, becomes relevant in the present model. Apart from the spherical constraint
we choose the update rules to be linear in this paper, so that we can solve the resulting
dynamical equations exactly, reminiscient of the p = 2 case known for spherical spin-
glasses [17]. In particular we are able to compute the volatility in all regions of the
phase diagram without making any approximations at any stage. In terms of the decision
making of the individual agents the linear spherical model corresponds to allowing them
to play linear combinations of strategies (rather than to pick the best one).
Despite its simple microscopic rules, the spherical MG as presented in this paper
shows interesting behaviour and exhibits novel features as well as properties analogous
to the ones of conventional MGs. In particular we find three distinct phases in the
(α, r)-plane. Our analytical findings are verified convincingly by numerical simulations.
2. Model Definitions
Before defining the spherical version of the MG and giving an interpretation of its update
rules, we will recall the dynamical rules of a conventional MG as studied for example
in [4, 12]. We label the N agents in the MG with Roman indices. At each round t
of the game each agent i takes a trading decision bi(t) ∈ IR (a ‘bid’) in response to
the observation of public information Iµ(t) which is chosen randomly and independently
from a set with p = αN possible values§, so µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , αN}. The rescaled total
market bid at round t is defined as A(t) = N−1/2
∑
i bi(t). Each agent i has S ≥ 2
fixed trading strategies (look-up tables) Ria = (R
1
ia, . . . , R
αN
ia ) at his or her disposal,
with a = 1, . . . , S. If agent i decides to use strategy a in round t of the game, his or
her bid at this stage will be bi(t) = R
µ(t)
ia . All strategies Ria are chosen randomly and
independently before the start of the game; they represent the quenched disorder of this
problem. The behaviour of the MG was found not to depend much on the value of S
[18, 19], nor on whether bids are discrete or continuous [2]. For convenience, we choose
S = 2 and Ria ∈ {−1, 1}αN in this paper. In order to decide which strategy to use, the
agents assign points pia(t) to each of their strategies, on the basis of what would have
happened if they had played that particular strategy:
pia(t) = pia(t)−Rµ(t)ia A(t). (1)
Strategies which would have produced a minority decision are thus rewarded. In the
conventional MG, at each round t each player i uses the strategy in his or her arsenal
with the highest score, i.e. bi(t) = R
µ(t)
ia˜i(t)
, where a˜i(t) = arg maxa pia(t). For S = 2 the
rules (1) can then be simplified upon introducing the differences qi(t) =
1
2
[pi1(t)−pi2(t)].
Thus, if qi(t) > 0, agent i plays strategy Ri1, whereas for qi(t) < 0 he or she plays Ri2.
§ This is the so-called MG with random external information; in the early MG definition [18] the
external information was not random but coded for the actual history of the global market.
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Hence, in the conventional MG bi(t) = ω
µ(t)
i + sgn[qi(t)]ξ
µ(t)
i , where ωi =
1
2
[Ri1 + Ri2]
and ξi =
1
2
[Ri1 −Ri2]. The evolution of the {qi} is given by
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− ξµ(t)i
[
Ωµ(t) +
1√
N
∑
j
ξ
µ(t)
j sgn[qj(t)]
]
(2)
with Ω = N−1/2
∑
j ωj . Equation (2) defines the standard (or so-called ‘on-line’) MG.
Alternatively, corresponding to updating the {qi} only everyO(N) time-steps, one might
define the dynamics in terms of an average over all possible values of the external
information in (2), resulting in the so-called (conventional) ‘batch’ MG [4]:
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− hi −
∑
j
Jij sgn[qj(t)]. (3)
Here Jij = 2N
−1ξi · ξj and hi = 2N−1/2ξi · Ω. See [13] for stochastic extensions and
[10] for consideration of the effects of anti-correlation of strategies on the comparison of
on-line and batch models.
The batch model (3) is particularly suitable for being replaced by a spherical
version. We first linearize (3), and subsequently normalize‖ the vector (q1, . . . , qN)
to a fixed length r > 0 at each iteraction step t, resulting in the spherical batch MG:
[1 + λ(t+ 1)]qi(t + 1) = qi(t)− hi −
∑
j
Jij qj(t), (4)
1
N
∑
i
q2i (t) = r
2 for all t. (5)
The values of the constraining forces λ(t) in (4) follow from (5); we exclude artificial
sign changes by insisting on 1 + λ(t) > 0 for all t. We note that our model (4,5) has no
analogue of the tabula rasa MG initialization, qi(0) = 0 for all i, often employed in the
conventional MG. We also note that the {qi} of the conventional MG (3) do not satisfy
a spherical constraint, unlike the spins of a conventional Ising spin system. There is
thus no reason for restricting oneself to r = 1. In fact, r is a new control parameter
and the system exhibits phase behaviour in the (α, r)-plane with interesting differences
from the conventional game.
The linearity of (4) implies that agents now play linear combinations of their
strategies. Upon presentation of public information Iµ at time t the bid of player i
in a corresponding on-line game is
bi(t) =
1
2
[1 + qi(t)]R
µ
i1 +
1
2
[1− qi(t)]Rµi2. (6)
The main object of natural interest in MGs is the volatility, which describes the standard
deviation of the total (re-scaled) market bid
Aµ[q(t)] =
1√
N
∑
i
[ωµi + qi(t)ξ
µ
i ] . (7)
‖ The spherical normalisation is necessary to suppress possible runaway solutions corresponding to
eigenmodes of the linear update rule with eigenvalues of a modulus larger than one.
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In the on-line models the relevant averages are over the stochasticity of the ‘information’.
In deterministic batch problems, such as discussed here, these averages are replaced by
ones over µ: 〈At〉 = p−1
∑p
µ=1A
µ[q(t)] and 〈AtAt′〉 = p−1
∑p
µ=1 A
µ[q(t)]Aµ[q(t′)]. The
volatility is defined as σ2t = 〈A2t 〉 − 〈At〉2. Here we follow [4] and define a more general
object, the volatility matrix Ξtt′ = 〈AtAt′〉 − 〈At〉〈At′〉:
Ξtt′ =
1
p
p∑
µ=1
Aµ[q(t)]Aµ[q(t′)]−
[
1
p
p∑
µ=1
Aµ[q(t)]
][
1
p
p∑
µ=1
Aµ[q(t′)]
]
. (8)
Note that σ2t = Ξtt. Random trading, with q(t) taken randomly and independently
from the sphere q2(t) = Nr2 at each time t, would result in 〈At〉 = O(N− 12 ) and
Ξtt′ =
1
2
+ 1
2
r2δtt′ +O(N− 12 ). The volatility measures the efficiency of the market, with
σ2t = 0 corresponding to a perfect match between supply and demand at time t.
3. Macroscopic Dynamics
The similarity between the spherical batch MG (4,5) and the conventional batch MG
(3) allows us to obtain the effective single trader equations for (4,5) simply by making
the substitutions q(t+ 1)→ [1 + λ(t+ 1)]q(t+ 1) and sgn[q(t)]→ q(t) in the results of
[4] (found within the generating functional analysis framework, in the limit N →∞):
[1 + λ(t+ 1)]q(t+ 1) = q(t) + θ(t)− α
∑
t′
(1I +G)−1tt′ q(t
′) +
√
α η(t). (9)
Here θ(t) is an external perturbation field introduced to generate response functions and
η(t) is a zero-average Gaussian noise, characterized by the following covariance matrix
(with Dtt′ = 1 + Ctt′ and 1Itt′ = δtt′):
Σtt′ = 〈η(t)η(t′)〉∗ =
[
(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1
]
tt′
. (10)
The matrices C and G and the constraining forces λ(t) are the dynamical order
parameters of the problem, to be determined self-consistently by solving
Ctt′ = 〈q(t)q(t′)〉∗, Gtt′ = ∂
∂θ(t′)
〈q(t)〉∗, Ctt = r2. (11)
One always has 〈q(t)〉∗ = 0. The physical meaning of C and G is given by
Ctt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈qi(t)qi(t′)〉, (12)
Gtt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂
∂θi(t′)
〈qi(t)〉, (13)
where · · · denotes an average over the disorder, i.e. over the space of all strategies in
the context of the MG. The brackets 〈. . .〉∗ in (10) and (11) refer to averaging over the
realisations of the process (9), i.e. over the noise {η(t)}. As usual, the single-agent
process (9) is non-Markovian.
It is possible to convert the system (9,10,11) into a pair of explicit iterative
equations for C and G. An explicit equation for C results upon multiplying (9)
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by q(t′) and subsequently averaging over the noise. We make use of the identity
〈η(t)q(t′)〉∗ =
√
α
∑
s(ΣtsGt′s) (derived via an integration by parts in the generating
functional; see [4] for an analogous identity in the conventional MG). To deal with G
(which obeys causality: Gtt′ = 0 for t ≤ t′) one takes a field derivative of (9), followed
by averaging. The result reads:
[1 + λ(t + 1)]Ct+1,t′ = Ctt′ + α[(1I +G)
−1D(1I +GT )−1GT ]tt′
− α[(1I +G)−1C]tt′ , (14)
[1 + λ(t+ 1)]Gt+1,t′ = Gtt′ − α[(1I +G)−1G]tt′ + δtt′ . (15)
These coupled equations have to be solved subject to the constraint Ctt = r
2 for all
t ≥ 0. Furthermore, as in [4] one finds for N → ∞ that the rescaled disorder-averaged
average bid 〈At〉 is zero at any time, and that the disorder-averaged volatility matrix
(8) is proportional to the covariance matrix of the single-trader noise:
lim
N→∞
Ξtt′ =
1
2
Σtt′ =
1
2
[
(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1
]
tt′
. (16)
The dynamic order parameters in the spherical model are prescribed in full by
(14,15), with the constraints Ctt = r
2 and 1+λ(t) > 0. As in [4], they can be calculated
iteratively, starting from (t, t′) = (0, 0), and upon using causality (i.e. [Gn]tt′ = 0 for
n > t− t′). Given the prescribed values C00 = r2 and G00 = 0 one finds, for instance:
λ(1) = − 1 + (1 + α(r−2− 1) + α2)1/2, (17)
G10 =
[
1 + α(r−2− 1) + α2]− 12 , (18)
C10 =
r2(1− α)√
1 + α(r−2− 1) + α2 (19)
(note: G11 = 0 and C11 = r
2). From these follow the volatility matrix elements:
Σ00 = 1 + r
2, (20)
Σ10 = 1− αr
2 + 1√
1 + α(r−2− 1) + α2 , (21)
Σ11 = 1 + r
2 − 2√
1 + α(r−2− 1) + α2 +
1− r2(1− 2α)
1 + α(r−2− 1) + α2 . (22)
This iteration can be carried out for an arbitrary number of time steps; in practice,
however, the terms become prohibitively more complicated for increasing times.
Alternatively, one may iterate (14,15) numerically. Unlike the procedure proposed in
[20] to generate realisations of the single trader process, the iteration of (14,15) does
not require averaging over the single agent noise, and thus provides very precise data
(albeit that numerically inverting the t× t matrices in (14,15) becomes more and more
costly as the number of time steps increases).
One observes that, due to the explicit form of (14,15) (and in sharp contrast
to the similar calculation in [4]), the temporal evolution of the macroscopic order
parameters is completely independent of initial conditions: as long as the constraint
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limN→∞N
−1
∑N
i=1 qi(0)
2 = C00 = r
2 is met the distribution P (qi(0)) from which the
initial point differences are drawn is irrelevant for the values of both C and G at finite
times as well as for the macroscopic stationary state. We have verified this in numerical
simulations, initializing the dynamics with different distributions for the qi(0), but all
with second moment N−1
∑N
i=1 q
2
i (0) = r
2. This property of the spherical MG is quite
distinct from the conventional MG, where the explicit analysis of the first few time
steps as presented in [4] reveals that the values of the correlation and response functions
at finite times depend on the higher moments of P (qi(0)) as well, and not only on its
variance. As far as the stationary state of the conventional MG is concerned the interest
so far has mainly focussed on starts of the form |qi(0)| = q0 for all i, with q0 = 0 for tabula
rasa starts and q0 > 0 for biased starts. Crucial differences between the two cases have
been found in the non-ergodic regime [3, 8, 9]. We have extended this analysis and have
performed simulations of the conventional batch game with different initial distributions
for the qi(0) all with the same second moment q
2
0. For fixed second moment we find
that qualitatively the stationary volatility does not depend on the higher moments of
P (qi(0)), but that differences in the quantitative values are found for different shapes of
the initial distribution of point differences.
Let us finally inspect the solution of (14,15) for small α and finite times. By
induction one finds
λ(t) = O(α), Gtt′ = Θtt′ +O(α), Ctt′ = r2 +O(α),
where Θtt′ = 1 if t > t
′ and Θtt′ = 0 otherwise. For the volatility we find Σtt = O(α2)
for all finite t ≥ 2. We conclude that for small α the system is in a completely frozen
state, with a divergent integrated response and vanishing volatility.
4. Analysis of Stationary States
4.1. Implications of Time-Translation Invariance
We now focus on time-translation invariant solutions of the dynamical equations (14,15),
i.e. we consider the system long after any initial equilibration and study solutions of
the form
Ctt′ = C(t− t′), Gtt′ = G(t− t′), λ(t) = λ. (23)
Then all matrices in (14,15) become Toeplitz matrices, and hence they commute. Given
(23) it is natural to express the dynamics in terms of the Fourier transforms of the
correlation and response functions. We use the following notation:
C(τ) =
∫ π
−π
dω
2π
eiωτ C˜(ω), C˜(ω) =
∑
τ
e−iωτC(τ) (24)
and similarly for G. The equations (14,15) subsequently translate into
∆˜(ω)C˜(ω) =
αD˜(ω)G˜(ω)∗
|1 + G˜(ω)|2 −
αC˜(ω)
1 + G˜(ω)
, (25)
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Figure 1. Phase diagram of the spherical MG, displaying three phases: O,
oscillating correlation function and finite integrated response; F, frozen phase with
finite integrated response; and AF, anomalous frozen phase with diverging integrated
response. Throughout the phase AF the volatility is zero. The O→F transition is
defined by (39), and the F→AF transition is defined by (46); both are continuous.
The discontinuous transition from O→AF occurs at α = 3 − 2√2 ≈ 0.172. The triple
point corresponds to α = 3− 2√2 and r = r∗ ≈ 0.455.
∆˜(ω)G˜(ω) = 1− αG˜(ω)
1 + G˜(ω)
, (26)
where ∆˜(ω) = (1 + λ)eiω − 1, and G˜(ω)∗ denotes the complex conjugate of G˜(ω).
Since D˜(ω) = C˜(ω) + 2πδ(ω), and upon defining the integrated static response
χ =
∑
τ G(τ) = G˜(0), we may rewrite (25) as[
∆˜(ω)|1 + G˜(ω)|2 + α
]
C˜(ω) = 2παχδ(ω). (27)
Note that considering the case ω = 0 in (26) allows us to express λ in terms of χ:
λ =
1 + χ(1− α)
χ(1 + χ)
. (28)
Finally, in the stationary state the volatility matrix Ξ is also of the Toeplitz form
Ξtt′ = Ξ(t− t′) and thus the volatility σ2 = Ξ(0) can be expressed as
σ2 =
1
2
∫ π
−π
dω
2π
C˜(ω)
|1 + G˜(ω)|2 +
1
2(1 + χ)2
. (29)
Since initial conditions play no role in the macroscopic dynamics, we must conclude that
as soon as multiple stationary solutions exist only one of these will ever be realized.
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Before we give a detailed account of the further analysis of the dynamical equations,
we briefly summarise our results. We find that, depending on the control parameters α
and r, the system displays three distinct phases, as illustrated in figure 1:
(i) a phase with finite integrated response and oscillatory behaviour of the correlation
function (O),
(ii) a frozen phase with finite integrated response (F),
(iii) a frozen phase exhibiting anomalous integrated response which grows linearly with
time (AF).
We will now proceed to obtain exact solutions of the dynamical equations in each of the
three phases.
4.2. Stationary States without Anomalous Response
We first inspect stationary states with finite χ, i.e. those for which perturbations will
decay sufficiently fast. It now follows from (27) that, for any ω 6= 0, C˜(ω) can be non-
zero only if ∆˜(ω)|1 + G˜(ω)|2 + α = 0. This requires ∆˜(ω) to be real, which is possible
only for ω = 0, π. We conclude that C˜(ω) = 2πc0δ(ω) + 2πc1δ(ω − π), or equivalently
C(τ) = c0 + c1(−1)τ . (30)
Here c0 and c1 (which will depend on the parameters α and r, as will χ) are coupled via
the spherical constraint: c0 + c1 = r
2. Insertion of (30) into (27) leads to the following
two coupled equations
c0
[
α + λ(1 + χ)2
]
= αχ, (r2− c0)
[
α− (λ+ 2)(1 + χ′)2] = 0 (31)
with χ′ =
∑
t(−1)tG(t) = G˜(π) measuring the response to persistent oscillating
perturbations. These equations are to be solved in combination with (26). We conclude
that there are two types of stationary states with finite χ: a frozen state, where c0 = r
2
(so c1 = 0), and an oscillating state, where c0 < r. We will work out their properties
separately below. For solutions of the form (30) we can also work out (29) further:
σ2 =
1 + c0
2(1 + χ)2
+
(r2 − c0)
2(1 + χ′)2
. (32)
Oscillating stationary states without anomalous response. Here c0 < r
2, and the
remaining four (coupled but closed) equations to be solved to find the stationary state
include one expression for χ′ which one obtains by choosing ω = π in (26):
c0 =
αχ
α + λ(1 + χ)2
, α = (λ+ 2)(1 + χ′)2, (33)
λ =
1 + χ(1− α)
χ(1 + χ)
, λ+ 2 = −1 + χ
′(1− α)
χ′(1 + χ′)
. (34)
The set (33,34) allows for two types of solutions. The first, where λ = α − 1 + 2√α,
obeys the requirement 1 + λ > 0 for all α. One must in fact demand λ > 0 in order to
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have a finite χ (as required), and we reject χ < 0 solutions on physical grounds. This
leaves:
λ = α− 1 + 2√α, (35)
χ =
1− α−√α +
√
2α3/2 + α2
−1 + 2√α + α , (36)
χ′ = − 1
1 +
√
α
. (37)
We note that λ, χ, χ′ and c0 are independent of r; only c1 depends on r via c1 = r
2− c0.
The second type of solution, where λ = α− 1− 2√α, meets our requirement λ+ 1 > 0
only for α > 4. It turns out that such solutions are never realized, so we will not give
their equations in full. We have now determined all order parameters and the volatility
in explicit form: c0 follows from insertion of (35,36) into the first equation of (33),
whereas the volatility follows upon inserting c0 and (36,37) into (32). For α → ∞ one
finds limα→∞ χ = 0, limα→∞ λ/α = 1, so that limα→∞ c0 = 0; the amplitude of the
oscillations in the correlations increases with increasing α.
The present solution breaks down when either χ→∞ or c1 → 0. The corresponding
mathematical conditions are found to be α = αc,1 (with χ < ∞ for α > αc,1) and
α = αc,2(r) (with c1 > 0 for α > αc,2(r)), respectively, where
αc,1 = 3− 2
√
2 ≈ 0.172, (38)
αc,2(r) =
[
1− 2 + 1/r
2
2
√
1 + 1/r2
]2
. (39)
We note that αc,1 = αc,2(r) at r = r
∗ =
√
αc,1/(1− αc,1) ≈ 0.455, and that αc,2(r) > αc,1
for r < r∗ and αc,2(r) < αc,1 for r > r
∗. Thus one expects that, as α is lowered for any
r > r∗, the amplitude of the oscillations of the correlations remains positive until the
critical value αc,1 is reached and a transition to a state with anomalous response occurs.
At this point one has
lim
α↓αc,1
σ2 =
1
3− 2√2
(
r2 − 3− 2
√
2
2(
√
2− 1)
)
. (40)
For r < r∗ the oscillatory behaviour of the correlations breaks down as α is lowered
before anomalous response sets in, and the system enters a frozen state with finite
integrated response.
Frozen stationary states without anomalous response. Here c0 = r
2, and there is no
need to calculate χ′; the coupled equations to be solved are simply
λχ2 + (2λ− α/r2)χ+ λ+ α = 0, (41)
λχ2 + (α− 1 + λ)χ− 1 = 0, (42)
from which we can determine λ and χ to be:
λ = − 1− α + (2 + 1/r
2)
√
α√
1 + 1/r2
, (43)
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χ = [
√
α
√
1 + 1/r2 − 1]−1. (44)
Upon inserting (44) and the relation c0 = r
2, one finds that our exact expression (32)
for the volatility simplifies to
σ2 =
1
2
[√
r2 + 1− r/√α
]2
. (45)
The present frozen state will cease to be a consistent solution at the point where χ
diverges. Equation (44) states that this happens at α = αc,3(r), where
αc,3(r) = r
2/(r2 + 1). (46)
The line α = αc,3(r) marks the transition between a frozen state with finite integrated
response (for α > αc,3(r)), and an anomalous frozen state (for α < αc,3(r)). According
to (45) it also coincides with the line where the volatility vanishes.
4.3. Frozen States with Anomalous Response
Numerical simulations for small α and large r reveal a parameter regime with a
stationary state in which the volatility vanishes, σ2 = 0, and where all agents are
frozen in such a way that
C(τ) = r2, λ(τ) = 0, χ =∞. (47)
These three identities clearly hold at the transition line (46), where anomalous response
first emerges in the frozen state. In this subsection we demonstrate that our dynamical
equations (14,15) indeed allow for self-consistent stationary state solutions with the
properties (47). Note that (47) directly imply that
∑
τ [1I + G]
−1(τ) = (1 + χ)−1 = 0,
and hence also σ2 = 0. Insertion of (47) as ansa¨tze into (14,15) now gives:
0 = [(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1GT ](τ)− [(1I +G)−1C](τ), (48)
G(τ + 1) = G(τ) + α(1I +G)−1(τ) + (1− α)δ(τ), (49)
where δ(τ) = 1 if τ = 0 and δ(τ) = 0 otherwise. We define the persistent response
g = limT→∞ T
−1
∑
τ≤T G(τ), and sum both sides of (49) from τ = 0 to τ = ℓ, to get:
G(ℓ+ 1) = 1− α + α
∑
τ≤ℓ
(1I +G)−1(τ). (50)
We conclude that g = 1 − α. From this, in turn, one infers for α < 1 that indeed
χ =
∑
τ G(τ) =∞, which confirms in retrospect that our ansa¨tze (47) indeed solve our
dynamical laws (48,49).
5. The Phase Diagram and its Verification
In the previous section we have identified three distinct phases, which according to
the extensive numerical simulations described below exhaust the phase diagram in the
(α, r)-plane of the present spherical MG. We have also derived explicit expressions for
the macroscopic order parameters and the volatility in all three phases, and we have
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Figure 2. Verification of O→AF and O→F transitions. Left pictures: Lagrange
parameter λ, oscillation amplitude c1 and volatility σ
2 versus α, for r =
1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5 (from top to bottom in the panels showing c1 and σ
2). Here
we expect to see the O→AF transition. Markers: simulations; solid lines: theory. The
dashed vertical line marks the predicted location αc,1 of the O→AF transition. Right
pictures: the same observables shown versus α, but now for r = 0.4, 0.3, 0.2; here we
expect to see the O→F transition. Markers: simulations for r = 0.2 (circles), r = 0.3
(squares) and r = 0.4 (diamonds); solid lines: theory. The lines are continued as
dashed lines into the opposite phases, where they should no longer be valid.
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been able to calculate the various phase boundaries in explicit form. Our results may
be summarised as follows:
α > max {αc,1, αc,2(r)} : oscillating phase (O)
oscillating C(t), finite χ
r < r∗, αc,3(r) < α < αc,2(r) : frozen phase (F)
constant C(t), finite χ
α < min {αc,1, αc,3(r)} : anomalous frozen phase (AF)
constant C(t), infinite χ
with
αc,1 = 3− 2
√
2, αc,2(r) =
[
1− r + 1/2r√
r2+ 1
]2
, αc,3(r) =
r2
r2+ 1
. (51)
The resulting phase diagram is shown in figure 1. Let us briefly discuss its main features.
For r > r∗ the behaviour of the spherical MG is similar to that of its conventional
counterparts, with a divergence of χ at some fixed critical α and χ remaining infinite
as α is reduced further to zero. There are crucial differences though: Firstly, in the
conventional MG persistent oscillations are found only for α < αc, while they decay
above the transition. The opposite is the case in the spherical model. Secondly, in the
conventional MG the volatility σ2 is a smooth function of α across the transition. In the
spherical model we find that the volatility (and the amplitude c1 of the oscillations as
well) exhibits a jump at α = αc,1 for r > r
∗. The discontinuity of σ2 follows immediately
from the nonzero value of (40) for r > r∗, which gives σ2 in the phase O close to the
O→AF transition, whereas one has σ2 = 0 throughout the AF phase. The magnitude
of the jump decreases as r is lowered and finally vanishes at r = r∗. Below r = r∗
no discontinuities are present and one finds an intermediate regime, where the system
freezes, but as yet with a finite χ. Only as α is lowered further a transition to a frozen
phase with anomalous integrated response takes place at α = αc,3(r), and below αc,3(r)
both the volatility and the normalisation factor λ vanish identically.
We have tested our theoretical predictions against numerical simulations of the
spherical MG. The data shown in the figures are all obtained from simulations of the
batch process (4,5) with N = 500 players, and averaged over 20 realisations of the
disorder (i.e. the realisations of the strategies). All measurements are temporal averages
over 250 time steps, preceded by 250 ‘equilibration’ steps. We focus on the parameter
regions where the various phase transitions are predicted to occur and depict the values
of the stationary order parameters λ and c1 as well as the volatility σ
2 as indicators for
the predicted transitions. The precise locations of the various transitions are given in
(51).
Figure 2 concerns the O→AF and O→F transitions. For r > r∗ ≈ 0.455 we expect
to see the O→AF transition. Here our theory predicts that λ = α − 1 + 2√α for
α > αc,1, and λ = 0 for α < αc,1. At αc,1 the volatility and the oscillation amplitude
c1 should both jump discontinuously to zero. For r < r
∗, on the other hand we should
observe the O→F transition where c1 goes to zero continuously at α = αc,2(r). We
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Figure 3. Verification of F→AF transition. Lagrange parameter λ (left) and volatility
σ2 (right) versus α, for r = 0.2 (circles), r = 0.3 (squares) and r = 0.4 (diamonds).
Solid lines: theory. Both observables are predicted to converge to zero as the transition
α = αc,3(r) is approached from above, and to remain zero below the transition.
also expect λ and σ2 to be continuous at this transition, albeit their derivatives with
respect to α change discontinuously. The data in figure 2 reveal full agreement between
theory and simulation (up to finite size effects close to the transitions). Although we
restrict ourselves to r ≤ 1 in figure 2, we have verified that the qualitative behaviour of
the system remains unchanged for larger values of r and that the very good agreement
between theory and simulation continues to hold for r > 1. Figure 3 concerns the F→AF
transition, where λ and σ2 are predicted to vanish as α approaches αc,3(r) from above.
Again we find good agreement between theory and numerical experiment.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a spherical version of the batch minority game,
with random public information. In this model the non-linear update rule of the
conventional game is replaced by an iteration prescription which is linear in the
microscopic degrees of freedom (the point differences qi(t)), complemented by a spherical
constraint N−1
∑
i q
2
i (t) = r
2. The spherical MG is designed to be exactly solvable in
the thermodynamic limit. In terms of the decision making of the individual agents, the
linearised microscopic dynamical laws corresponds to allowing the agents to play linear
combinations of their two strategies. The relevant control parameters of the spherical
MG are the radius r of the sphere to which the dynamics is confined and the ratio
α = p/N of the number of possible values of the external information over the number
of agents.
Using the dynamic mean field theory introduced by De Dominicis we are able to
perform the average over the disorder and to take the thermodynamic limit. This
formalism reduces the original N -agent dynamics to a non-Markovian effective single-
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agent stochastic process. Like in spherical spin-glass models, the temporal evolution
of the macroscopic order parameters (the correlation and response functions) can be
formulated in terms of a pair of coupled iterative equations, without referring to the
microscopic single effective-agent process. Assuming the existence of a time-translation
invariant stationary state we are able to solve these equations exactly, and to compute
the order parameters in the stationary state as well as the stationary volatility at every
point of the phase diagram without making any approximations.
We find that, although the update rule is relatively simple compared to the
conventional MG, the spherical MG displays a remarkably rich structure. Depending
on r and α the system exhibits three distinct phases, two without anomalous response
(an oscillating and a frozen state) and a further frozen phase with diverging integrated
response. As described above the spherical model exhibits some similarities as well as
intriguing differences compared to conventional MGs. The four main differences are (i)
the absence of any macroscopic dynamical effect of the choice of the initial microscopic
state in the spherical game, (ii) the fact that, for any r, the volatility is always zero
close to α = 0 whereas in the conventional MGs both high-volatility and low-volatility
solutions can be found, (iii) persistent oscillations in the spherical MG, which increase
for increasing α and vanish for low α, where in the conventional batch MG persistent
oscillations can only be found in the low-α regime and (iv) the discontinuous dependence
of the volatility on α in the spherical MG for r > r∗.
In summary, our study demonstrates that the dynamical rules of the conventional
MG can be simplified to obtain a completely solvable spherical version, which still
displays a non-trivial phase diagram and some novel features, which are not observed in
conventional MGs. It would be interesting to study further the mathematical properties
of the spherical model, such as the relaxation towards the stationary state and possible
ageing phenomena.
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